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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 






This matter is before the court on the defendants' appeal 
and the plaintiffs' cross-appeal in this medical malpractice 
case. Ordinarily, following a jury verdict we set forth the 
facts from the perspective most favorable to the verdict 
winner. In this case, however, to the extent that the appeal 
challenges the verdict, we are affirming and thus we need 
not follow that practice. On the other hand, we are 
reversing with respect to the district court's refusal to 
charge contributory negligence and thus we set forth the 
facts in a neutral manner, as the defendants were entitled 
to that charge if there was any evidence to support it. 
 
In February 1992, 17-year old Alyssa Alexander became 
seriously ill, and her father took her to Wetzel County 
Hospital in New Martinsville, West Virginia. After only a few 
hours, Alyssa was transferred to Ohio Valley Medical 
Center in Wheeling, West Virginia. On February 16, 1992, 
after four days and no diagnosis, Alyssa's parents insisted 
that she be transferred to Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh. 
 
Shortly after Alyssa was admitted to Children's Hospital, 
Dr. Susan Orenstein diagnosed her as having Wilson's 
Disease, a rare disorder of the liver that allows excessive 
amounts of copper to accumulate in various organs. Dr. 
Orenstein immediately consulted with Dr. Jorge Reyes, 
head of the liver transplant team at Children's Hospital. Dr. 
Reyes opined that a liver transplant was probably the only 
way to save Alyssa. Dr. Orenstein also consulted with Dr. 
Israel Scheinberg, a New York expert in Wilson's Disease. 
Dr. Scheinberg opined that Alyssa first could receive an 
alternate treatment to remove copper from the body 
(chelation), but that her chances of survival on this therapy 
were only about 25%. Dr. Scheinberg also stated that if 
Alyssa's liver function continued to deteriorate on chelation 
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therapy in the first few days, her chances of survival 
without a transplant were very slim. According to Dr. 
Orenstein, she relayed all this information to the 
Alexanders. Dr. Reyes also relayed to the Alexanders his 
belief that a transplant was necessary. In the meantime, 
Dr. Orenstein initiated the chelation therapy, and Alyssa's 
condition stabilized. 
 
On February 27, 1992, Dr. Reyes offered Alyssa a liver 
for transplant and discussed his opinion with her and her 
parents. Dr. Orenstein testified that she discussed with the 
family the possibility that another liver might not become 
available before Alyssa's condition deteriorated, as well as 
the option of continuing chelation therapy. Alyssa and her 
parents decided not to accept the liver for transplant. 
 
On March 2, 1992, Dr. Deborah Neigut assumed the 
primary care of Alyssa. Dr. Neigut saw Mrs. Alexander 
daily, and often discussed with her and Alyssa the risks 
and complications of their options. At one point, Mrs. 
Alexander told Dr. Neigut that she did not want Alyssa on 
the waiting list for a liver, but Dr. Neigut convinced her that 
it would not be a good idea to take Alyssa off the waiting 
list. While Alyssa was under Dr. Neigut's care, Dr. Reyes 
offered her a second liver on March 17, 1992. At that time, 
Alyssa's condition was stable. Dr. Neigut again discussed 
with the family the two options available, along with the 
risks and complications of each. The family refused the 
second liver. 
 
Dr. Neigut then consulted with Dr. James Malatack, a 
pediatrician with experience in treating children with 
Wilson's Disease. Dr. Malatack testified that he told Mr. 
Alexander that the chelation therapy might work but 
probably would not, and that the family should accept the 
next available liver for a transplant. Mr. and Mrs. 
Alexander, however, testified that they did not learn of Dr. 
Malatack's recommendation until after Alyssa's death. 
 
From March 25 to March 29 or 30, Dr. Philip Putnam 
assumed primary care of Alyssa. During those five days, he 
made no recommendations regarding transplantation, nor 
did he discuss with the family Alyssa's chances of survival 
with or without transplantation. 
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On April 1, Dr. Neigut again resumed primary care of 
Alyssa. On that date, Dr. Reyes offered a third liver to 
Alyssa. Dr. Reyes reiterated to the family his opinion that 
Alyssa should receive a liver transplant. Mrs. Alexander 
testified that Dr. Neigut recommended that the family turn 
down the third liver. The family did so. 
 
On April 6, Dr. Putnam resumed primary care of Alyssa. 
The next day, Alyssa had a reaction to a blood transfusion 
which caused lung injury and sudden systemic 
deterioration. At Dr. Putnam's recommendation, Alyssa 
underwent an emergency liver transplant on April 9. She 
developed respiratory distress syndrome and died on April 
21, 1992. 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
On January 18, 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Alexander, on their 
own behalf and on behalf of Alyssa's estate, filed in the 
district court a complaint setting forth a wrongful death 
and survival action against the University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center System ("UPMCS"), Children's Hospital, Dr. 
Orenstein, Dr. Neigut, and Dr. Putnam. The Alexanders 
alleged that the three doctors: (1) lacked the knowledge to 
treat and advise Alyssa; (2) failed to evaluate and interpret 
the diagnostic information; (3) failed to report information 
to the family to permit them to make informed choices; (4) 
misled the family as to Alyssa's true condition and 
prognosis; (5) failed to recommend appropriate treatment 
(transplant); and (6) failed to follow the recommendations of 
the liver transplant experts. The Alexanders sued Children's 
Hospital and the UPMCS as principals of the three doctors. 
 
On December 21, 1995, the district court granted the 
UPMCS's motion for summary judgment. On April 20, 
1998, upon stipulation of the parties, the district court 
dismissed Children's Hospital. The case proceeded to a jury 
trial as to the claims against the doctors. The doctors 
requested that the district court submit the issue of the 
Alexanders' contributory negligence to the jury but the 
district court denied this request. 
 
On May 4, 1998, the jury found that each of the three 
doctors was negligent in advising the Alexanders regarding 
Alyssa's treatment, and that the negligence of each doctor 
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was a substantial factor in causing Alyssa's death. The jury 
determined that 25% of the negligence was attributable to 
Dr. Orenstein, 50% was attributable to Dr. Neigut, and 25% 
was attributable to Dr. Putnam. The jury awarded 
 905<!>substantial damages for pain and suffering, medical 
 
expenses, funeral expenses, and loss of services. The 
expenses incurred at Alyssa's stays at Wetzel County 
Hospital and Ohio Valley Medical Center, both of which 
occurred prior to Alyssa's transfer to Children's Hospital, 
were included in the award for medical expenses. 
 
On May 8, 1998, the doctors filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 
motion for judgment as a matter of law and a Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 59 motion for a new trial. On May 15, 1998, the district 
court denied the doctors' Rule 50 motion, and on July 1, 
1998, denied their Rule 59 motion. The doctors filed a 
timely notice of appeal on July 17. On August 25, 1998, the 
district court entered a final judgment in favor of the 
Alexanders, but reduced the amount of medical expenses 
awarded by $8,943.96, the expenses they incurred at the 
two hospitals that treated Alyssa before she was transferred 
to Children's Hospital. Subsequently, the doctors amended 
their notice of appeal to include the August 25, 1998 order. 
The Alexanders filed a timely notice of cross-appeal, 
contesting the district court's reduction of damages for 
medical expenses. 
 
II. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL 
 
The doctors on their appeal contend that the Alexanders 
were guilty of contributory negligence because they rejected 
livers available to Alyssa during her stay at Children's 
Hospital. They also argue that statements by the 
Alexanders' counsel during closing argument were 
prejudicial. If we accept either of these two points, we 
would remand for a new trial. Dr. Putnam argues that he 
was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as he was not 
involved in Alyssa's care when the livers were offered. On 
the cross-appeal, the Alexanders contend that the court 
erred by reducing the verdict for the medical expenses by 
$8,943.96 incurred at the two hospitals before she was 
transferred to Children's Hospital. 
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 
To the extent the doctors argue that the district court 
erred by refusing to submit the issue of contributory 
negligence to the jury, our review is plenary. See Woodson 
v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699, 701 (3d Cir. 
1988). Similarly, we exercise plenary review with respect to 
Dr. Putnam's argument that the district court erred by 
denying his Rule 50 motion for a judgment as a matter of 
law. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 
1166 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law should be granted only if viewing all the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor. Id. 
We also exercise plenary review on the cross-appeal, as the 
effect of the district court's action in reducing the verdict 
was to grant the defendants a judgment as a matter of law 




A. Contributory Negligence 
 
The doctors first argue that the district court erred in 
refusing to allow the jury to consider whether the 
Alexanders were contributorily negligent in rejecting Dr. 
Reyes' three offers for a liver transplant. The doctors assert 
that evidence exists from which the jury could have 
concluded that the Alexanders were informed fully and 
completely of the risks to Alyssa in rejecting these livers 
and thus were negligent in doing so, and that the 
Alexanders' negligence contributed to Alyssa's death. Thus, 
the doctors contend they are entitled to a new trial. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, which is applicable here, if there 
is any evidence of contributory negligence in a medical 
malpractice case, the court must submit the issue to the 
jury, even if the evidence to the contrary is strong. Althaus 
v. Cohen, 710 A.2d 1147, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); 
Pascal v. Carter, 647 A.2d 231, 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); 
Levine v. Rosen, 575 A.2d 579, 580-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990); see also Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 167 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (recognizing Pennsylvania law in submitting 
issue of contributory negligence to jury). In addition, the 
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plaintiff's negligent conduct must be a proximate cause of 
her injury; if there is no evidence of causation between the 
plaintiff's negligence and her injuries, the trial court 
properly may refuse to instruct the jury on contributory 
negligence. Althaus, 710 A.2d at 1157-58. Of course, in 
Pennsylvania contributory negligence if established will be 
an aspect of a comparative negligence analysis. See 
Ferguson v. Panzarella, 700 A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. 1997). 
 
Here, the district court erred in refusing to submit the 
question of the Alexanders' contributory negligence to the 
jury. We set forth in detail the evidence which leads us to 
this conclusion. 
 
1. Dr. Reyes' Testimony 
 
Dr. Reyes testified that he told the Alexanders that Alyssa 
needed a transplant. App. at 513. He testified that he spoke 
directly to the Alexanders because he was concerned about 
Alyssa and her family and wanted to make sure they knew 
"the risks for and against transplantation." App. at 522. Dr. 
Reyes testified that he told Alyssa and her parents that 
"Alyssa had a better chance of recovery with a liver 
transplant." App. at 530. He testified that Alyssa and Mrs. 
Alexander "did not want a liver transplant." Id. Dr. Reyes 
testified that he provided the Alexanders with all the 
appropriate information concerning a transplant, including 
the risks in transplantation and in refusing 
transplantation, because he "felt that there was going to be 
a bad outcome without a transplant," but that he never 
directly stated that Alyssa must have a transplant. App. at 
534. Dr. Reyes also testified that when Alyssa was in 
intensive care, Mr. Alexander told him that they (the 
Alexanders) "had made a mistake and a bad decision" in 
refusing the livers. App. at 536. 
 
2. Dr. Orenstein's Testimony 
 
Dr. Orenstein testified that she told the Alexanders about 
the note Dr. Scheinberg (the New York expert in Wilson's 
Disease) wrote, in which Dr. Scheinberg opined that 
survival without a liver transplant was unlikely. App. at 
406, 438, 1080. Dr. Orenstein testified that when the first 
liver was offered, she and the Alexanders "had a very 
detailed discussion about the significant risks of 
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deterioration abruptly without being able to get another 
liver." App. at 440. Dr. Orenstein remembered specifically 
communicating the risks involved in rejecting a liver. App. 
at 1075. She also testified that the Alexanders were 
"provided with all relevant medical information concerning 
treatment options and concerning risks, benefits and 
possible complications, available treatment options," during 
the period of time in which Alyssa was under Dr. 
Orenstein's care, and that the Alexanders "were very clear 
about the treatment options." App. at 446. Dr. Orenstein 
testified that although she did not "advocate transplant," 
she never advised against it. App. at 1103. 
 
3. Dr. Neigut's Testimony 
 
Dr. Neigut testified that she considered a transplant an 
option throughout the period when she was Alyssa's 
primary care physician, and that the family was aware of 
that option. App. at 338. Dr. Neigut testified that when the 
second liver was offered, she discussed with Mrs. Alexander 
and Alyssa the risks and complications of their options. 
App. at 349-50. She also testified that each time a liver was 
offered, she discussed several times with Mrs. Alexander 
and Alyssa the "risks of acute problems developing" if they 
rejected the liver. App. at 366, 1594. Dr. Neigut testified 
that Mrs. Alexander said that she wanted to take Alyssa off 
the waiting list for a liver, but that Dr. Neigut recommended 
that Alyssa stay on the list. App. at 1617, 1618. Dr. Neigut 
testified that she never advised against a transplant. App. 
at 1630, 1646. 
 
4. Dr. Malatack's Deposition 
 
Dr. Malatack (an outside consultant) testified that after 
he examined Alyssa, he told Mr. Alexander that it was 
possible that chelation therapy would work, but that he 
suggested transplantation. App. at 1360, 1364. Dr. 
Malatack testified that he told Mr. Alexander that they 
should accept the next available liver. App. at 1371. 
 
5. Mr. Alexander's Testimony 
 
Mr. Alexander testified that the transplant team told him 
that Alyssa needed a transplant. App. at 810. Mr. 
Alexander testified that he wrote in his journal that Dr. 
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Reyes told him that a transplant was probably the only 
thing that would help Alyssa. App. at 841. Mr. Alexander 
testified that on a "couple different occasions," Dr. Reyes 
told him he wanted to perform transplant surgery. App. at 
847, 866, 882. Mr. Alexander testified that Drs. Orenstein 
and Neigut told them about the options of transplant and 
chelation. App. at 843. Mr. Alexander also testified that he 
made the ultimate decision to reject the first liver. App. at 
869-70. He also testified that he, his wife, and Alyssa made 
the decision to reject the second and third livers. App. at 
873-75. 
 
6. Mrs. Alexander's Testimony 
 
Mrs. Alexander testified that the transplant team 
advocated performing transplant surgery. App. at 899. Mrs. 
Alexander testified that Dr. Reyes and the transplant team 
came to Alyssa's room to check on her "at least a couple of 
times a week." App. at 908. Mrs. Alexander testified that 
Dr. Reyes continually recommended that they accept the 
next available liver for transplant. App. at 929-30. In 
particular she said "Well, they always said, you know, she 
needed the transplant." 
 
Based on this evidence, a jury could have concluded that 
the Alexanders were negligent in rejecting the three offers 
for a liver transplant, and that their negligence was a 
substantial factor in causing Alyssa's death. While the 
Alexanders counter that they cannot be negligent for 
following the negligent advice of the three doctors, they 
concede that they shared responsibility in the decision- 
making process and, in any event, the record fully supports 
a conclusion that they did so. Still, they contend that the 
doctors adduced no independent evidence that they acted 
negligently. 
 
We reject the Alexanders' contentions because the 
doctors are correct that evidence exists from which the jury 
could have concluded that they were informed fully of the 
risks involved in treating Alyssa through chelation therapy 
and through transplantation. Clearly, evidence also exists 
from which the jury could have concluded that the 
Alexanders' decisions to reject three offers for a liver 
transplant substantially contributed to Alyssa's death. 
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Inasmuch as there was such evidence, the district court 
erred by refusing to submit the issue of the Alexanders' 
contributory negligence to the jury. Thus, a new trial is 
necessary. 
 
In reaching our result we have taken note of Judge Alito's 
statement in his dissent that "[t]he negligent advice 
provided by the defendant physicians was found by the jury 
to have caused a young woman's death." Conc. Op. at 18. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Orenstein pointed out that the one year 
survival rate following liver transplants was from 65% to 
85% and was lower thereafter. App. at 407. Thus, even if 
the Alexanders had elected the transplant they had no 
assurance that Alyssa would survive. In the circumstances 
it is entirely possible that regardless of what the doctors 
had advised, Alyssa would have died. The unfortunate fact 
is that the Alexanders did not have a good choice and may 
have been negligent in making the choice they did. 
 
Finally, with respect to contributory negligence, the 
doctors correctly point out that this case is both a survival 
and wrongful death action and in a footnote in their brief 
they address the ramifications of a contributory negligence 
defense in this situation. Br. at 19 n.6. The Alexanders 
have not addressed the point in their brief. In the 
circumstances, we leave the resolution as to how to deal 
with the contributory negligence defense to the district 
court on remand. 
 
B. Improper remarks during closing 
 
Alternatively, the doctors argue that counsel for the 
Alexanders made improper and prejudicial statements 
during his closing argument that were so blatant that a 
new trial is warranted. In view of our result, we need not 
consider this point but we observe that the Alexanders' 
attorney was close to, if not over, the edge of what is 
acceptable. 
 
C. Denial of Dr. Putnam's Rule 50 Motion 
 
Dr. Putnam argues that the district court erred in 
denying his Rule 50 motion for a judgment as a matter of 
law because he was not negligent, and even if he was 
negligent, there is no evidence that his negligence was a 
 
                                11 
  
proximate cause of Alyssa's injuries and death. In 
particular, while Dr. Putnam concedes that he was Alyssa's 
primary care provider from March 25 through March 29, he 
correctly points out that no livers became available during 
those few days. He also correctly notes that no evidence 
suggests that he ever advised the Alexanders to reject a 
liver transplant. He alternatively argues that if he was 
negligent in giving advice during those few days, his 
negligence was not a factor in causing Alyssa's death. 
 
The Alexanders respond that the evidence shows that at 
the time Dr. Putnam assumed primary care of Alyssa on 
March 25, he knew that Dr. Reyes had concluded that a 
transplant was the only way to save Alyssa. Dr. Putnam 
also knew that Dr. Reyes already twice had offered Alyssa 
a liver and that she was still on the waiting list. Dr. Putnam 
also knew that Drs. Neigut and Orenstein were reluctant to 
make such an assertive recommendation. 
 
Additionally, one of the Alexanders' expert witnesses, Dr. 
Brewer, testified that in mid-March, a "very, very ominous 
turn of events" occurred. App. at 571. According to Dr. 
Brewer, tests in mid-March showed a reduction in the 
production of certain enzymes, an indicator that Alyssa's 
liver was failing and was so damaged that it never would 
recover. Id. If Dr. Putnam had reviewed Alyssa's chart 
properly and recognized these warning signs, the 
Alexanders argue, he would have recommended 
transplantation. He did not, and on April 1, the Alexanders 
rejected the third liver. 
 
It is true that Dr. Putnam was no longer Alyssa's primary 
care provider on April 1. Nonetheless, the third liver 
became available just a day or two after his primary care of 
Alyssa ended. In this regard, the record is unclear whether 
Dr. Putnam's primary care of Alyssa ended on March 29 or 
March 30. Thus, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude 
that Dr. Putnam was negligent in not informing the 
Alexanders about Alyssa's deterioration in mid-March and 
in not recommending that they accept the next available 
liver. The evidence suggests that Dr. Putnam's negligence 
was less than Dr. Neigut's or Dr. Orenstein's, and the 
Alexanders recognize as much. Nevertheless, record 
evidence supports the jury's finding that Dr. Putnam was 
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negligent and that his negligence contributed to Alyssa's 
death. Thus, the district court did not err in denying his 
Rule 50 motion for a judgment as a matter of law. 
 
D. The Cross-Appeal 
 
On cross-appeal, the Alexanders argue that the district 
court erred by reducing the jury's award for medical 
expenses by $8,943.96, the amount of expenses incurred at 
the two hospitals where Alyssa was taken before being 
transferred to Children's Hospital. The Alexanders assert 
that they should be reimbursed for the expenses incurred 
at the other two hospitals because the doctors' negligence 
rendered those expenses futile. Plainly, this argument lacks 
merit and requires little discussion. 
 
In fact, the Alexanders recognize that they are entitled to 
"damages that reasonably flow from the tortious act." Br. at 
20. Here, the doctors' only possible tortious act was failing 
to recognize and recommend to the Alexanders that a liver 
transplant was the only way to save Alyssa's life. Obviously, 
the medical expenses the Alexanders incurred before Alyssa 
ever came under the care of these doctors did not 




For the foregoing reasons, to the extent that the doctors, 
i.e., Dr. Putnam, appeal from the order denying the motion 
for a judgment as a matter of law in its order of May 15, 
1998, we will affirm. To the extent that the doctors appeal 
from the order of July 1, 1998, denying their motion for a 
new trial, we will reverse. We also will reverse the order of 
August 25, 1998, entering a final judgment for the 
Alexanders but will affirm the order to the extent that it 
denied the Alexanders a recovery of $8,943.96 for expenses 
before Alyssa was transferred to Children's Hospital. We 
will remand the case for a new trial and for such other 
proceedings as may be appropriate consistent with this 
opinion. The parties will bear their own costs on this 
appeal. 
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DOWD, District Judge, concurring: 
 
Although I concur completely in Judge Greenberg's 
opinion, I write separately merely to clarify some points 
which I believe may provide additional guidance to district 
courts. 
 
This case, involving a young girl who lost her life, is 
naturally laden with emotion. It is no surprise that Alyssa's 
parents want to place responsibility for her death 
somewhere. What parent would not long to find a reason 
for the untimely death of a child? Unfortunately, the 
extremely sympathetic and sensitive nature of this case 
puts it squarely in a category of cases that can be difficult 
to deal with because ultimate resolution of the issues may 
not be particularly satisfying to any of the parties involved. 
Nonetheless, courts of law are often asked to resolve just 
such controversies. In doing so, a court must attempt to set 
aside raw emotion and/or personal preferences and simply 
apply the law. 
 
An important issue in this appeal is whether the district 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense 
of contributory negligence. As properly pointed out by 
Judge Greenberg, "under Pennsylvania law, which is 
applicable here, if there is any evidence of contributory 
negligence in a medical malpractice case, the court must 
submit the issue to the jury, even if the evidence to the 
contrary is strong." Maj. Op. at 7 (citing cases). One case 
not cited by Judge Greenberg is even stronger in its 
requirement that the issue go to the jury. In Berry v. 
Friday, 472 A.2d 191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), 1 the appellant 
argued that the contributory negligence charge given by the 
trial court constituted error because the facts of the case 
did not allow for an inference of contributory negligence.2 
The court stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Berry, malpractice was alleged where a treating physician permitted 
his patient with a heart condition to return to work without first 
inquiring as to the specific nature of the patient's work duties which, as 
it turned out, entailed heavy lifting. 
 
2. In instructing the jury on contributory negligence, the trial court 
"[tied] in the law with its possible application to the facts, 
specifically 
mentioning Mr. Berry's weight and smoking problems." Berry, 472 A.2d 
at 194 (footnote omitted). 
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       While we agree that the evidence in the case does not 
       strongly favor a finding of contributory negligence, we 
       cannot ignore the slim possibility. As stated by our 
       Supreme Court, "where there is any evidence which 
       alone would justify an inference of the disputed fact, it 
       must go to the jury, no matter how strong or 
       persuasive may be the countervailing proof." 
 
Id. at 194 (quoting Heffernan v. Rosser , 419 Pa. 550, 554- 
55, 215 A.2d 655, 657 (1966)). Like it or not, Pennsylvania 
law gives very little discretion to the trial judge 3 and 
requires a contributory negligence charge even when 
contributory negligence is only a slim possibility. 4 
 
Judge Alito is troubled by the fact that, in his view, the 
Alexanders cannot be found to have acted unreasonably in 
following the advice of their primary care physicians. Dis. 
Op. at 21. Maybe that is true; but that is precisely the issue 
which a jury, not a trial judge, must decide under 
Pennsylvania law. The trial judge's role is to ascertain 
whether there is "any evidence" which might support a 
finding of contributory negligence. If, as in the instant case, 
there is such evidence, it is for the jury to decide whether 
there was contributory negligence. To resolve that question, 
the jury, not this court, will have to decide whether the 
Alexanders' conduct was reasonable under the 
circumstances. If their conduct was not reasonable, they 
may be found contributorily negligent if that conduct is also 
found to be a proximate cause of Alyssa's death. 
 
My thoughts on this matter are somewhat influenced by 
Fish v. Gosnell, 463 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). In 
that case, Fish was plowing snow out of his driveway, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Often a trial judge has the duty and the discretion to determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence for an issue to go to the jury. Under 
Pennsylvania law, however, it appears that even a scintilla of evidence on 
the issue of contributory negligence is sufficient to constitute a jury 
issue. 
 
4. The Berry court further noted that"a party's negligence must be 
submitted to the jury unless there is no evidence from which an 
affirmative finding could be made without resort to speculation." Berry, 
472 A.2d at 194 n.4 (emphasis added) (quoting Yandrich v. Radic, 435 
A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)). 
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operating his garden tractor plow near the berm of the 
highway. As Gosnell drove by in his automobile, he struck 
Fish, resulting in severe and permanent injuries. A jury 
found Gosnell 80% negligent and Fish 20% negligent, 
awarding Fish a net verdict of $64,000. The trial court later 
added 10% per annum in pre-award delay damages under 
Pa.R.Civ.P. 238. On appeal, Fish's argument that the trial 
court erred in refusing to instruct on the defense of 
assumption of the risk was rejected. 
 
In the instant case, there has apparently never been an 
argument relating to assumption of the risk. However, the 
Fish court's discussion of that issue throws some light on 
the concept of contributory negligence in a situation where, 
as here, great loss has been suffered by the persons against 
whom the defense is leveled. On the theory that these 
persons have suffered enough, a trial judge might be 
reluctant to permit the contributory negligence defense. 
Fish, however, illuminates: 
 
       Prosser explains that the negligent encountering of 
       traffic is not assumption of the risk by this example, "A 
       pedestrian who walks across the street in the middle of 
       a block, through a stream of traffic travelling at high 
       speed, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be 
       found to consent that the drivers shall not use care to 
       avoid running him down." W. Prosser, [Law of Torts] at 
       445. Accord Hildebrand v. Minyard, 16 Ariz.App. 583, 
       494 P.2d 1238 (1972). 
 
       . . . [Fish] may have been foolhardy and negligent, but 
       he cannot be said to have consented that oncoming 
       drivers abandon their duty of care to keep their 
       vehicles under sufficient control in the snowy 
       conditions to avoid a collision. . . . [Fish's] entire 
       course of conduct is properly analyzed as possible 
       negligence, and was thus correctly submitted to the 
       jury as possible comparative negligence. . . . 
 
Fish v. Gosnell, 463 A.2d at 579. 
 
A properly instructed jury might ultimately conclude that 
the Alexanders acted unreasonably, precisely because the 
advice of Alyssa's primary care physicians and consulting 
specialists was in stark conflict, that the Alexanders were 
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fully informed regarding the risks of chelation as opposed 
to transplantation, and that they were contributorily 
negligent for having chosen to pursue the less aggressive 
therapy in the face of the very real risk of Alyssa's death 
absent a liver transplant. On the other hand, a properly 
instructed jury might also find that the Alexanders acted 
entirely reasonably precisely because even the doctors 
could not agree on what should be done. The jury might 
conclude, exactly as Judge Alito would, that the physicians 
should not "escape all or part of the liability for their 
malpractice because the young woman and her parents 
were foolish to have followed their bad advice." Dis. Op. at 
18. 
 
In addition, as in Fish, supra, a reasonable jury could 
find that the Alexanders were negligent to ignore the advice 
of specialists (which made clear that Alyssa would probably 
die without a liver transplant) in favor of the advice of non- 
specialists (who recommended less aggressive treatment), 
while at the same time finding (as the jury did in this case) 
that the defendants had abandoned their duty of care. The 
Alexanders, like people stepping out into traffic, could still 
reasonably expect that their doctors, like the drivers, would 
exercise due care under the circumstances. It is possible for 
a jury to find negligence on both sides, in which case 
damages must be apportioned under Pennsylvania's 
Comparative Negligence Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. S 7102. 
 
No matter how strong might be this court's opinion or 
preference as to how this case should turn out, no matter 
how troubling this court might find the notion that the 
Alexanders, who have already suffered a great loss, 
somehow contributed to that loss, the issue of contributory 
negligence is not a determination for the court. The issue 
should have been submitted to the jury. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The negligent advice provided by the defendant 
physicians was found by the jury to have caused a young 
woman's death,5 and the defendants do not contest the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting that finding. They 
now argue, however, that they should escape all or part of 
the liability for their malpractice because the young woman 
and her parents were foolish to have followed their bad 
advice. The majority holds that the trial judge should have 
charged the jury on this defense. In my view, however, 
there is no evidence that the girl and her parents were 
negligent. Their only mistake was to trust the defendants' 
advice, which, although negligent, was not so implausible 
on its face that lay people should have known better than 




It is important to keep in mind that the jury found that 
the defendants "were negligent in advising [the Alexanders] 
regarding options for the treatment of her condition," see 
app. at 1860, and that the defendants do not dispute the 
fact that there was sufficient evidence to support this 
finding. The defendants, contrary to the advice of the 
experts who were consulted regarding Alyssa's condition, 
never recommended a liver transplant but instead 
advocated the use of chelation therapy. 
 
1. Dr. Scheinberg 
 
Dr. Scheinberg, an expert on Wilson's disease, testified 
that when the livers became available, chelation therapy 
was not a reasonable option. See App. at 686-87. By failing 
to recommend strongly in favor of a transplant, Dr. 
Scheinberg testified, the defendants violated the applicable 
standard of care. See id. at 687. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See App. 1861 (verdict sheet showing jury found defendants' 
negligence was "a substantial factor in causing Alyssa Alexander's 
death"). 
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2. Dr. Neigut 
 
Dr. Neigut, one of the defendants, testified that when the 
second liver became available, she advised the Alexanders 
that "there was no clear-cut indication that[a liver 
transplant] would be imperative . . . to avoid death" and 
that the transplant was not "the only option." Id. at 349. 
Dr. Neigut stated that when the third liver became 
available, she told Mrs. Alexander that she "did not see an 
urgent need at that point to pursue the transplant." Id. at 
359. She also testified that she advocated chelation therapy 
and explained to the Alexanders that Alyssa would be in a 
better condition in the long-term if they avoided a 
transplant. See id. at 360. 
 
Dr. Neigut also said that it was "reasonable" for the 
Alexanders to rely on her advice because she was their 
primary care physician. See id. at 373-74. She testified 
that, as Alyssa's primary care physician, she had daily 
contact with Alyssa and was "primarily responsible for 
collating all [of the] information, for reasoning through all 
[of the] information, and making recommendations to the 
family." Id. at 373. 
 
3. Dr. Orenstein 
 
Dr. Orenstein, another defendant, testified that when the 
first liver became available, she "agreed with" the 
Alexanders that chelation therapy was a reasonable way to 
proceed. See id. at 408. Dr. Orenstein also testified that she 
discussed the risks of electing to continue chelation therapy 
but stressed that chelation therapy was the "preferred" 
method of treatment. See id. at 440. Dr. Orenstein did not 
dispute that she told the Alexanders that it would be 
appropriate for them to reject the livers. See id. at 425-26. 
Dr. Orenstein further testified that her recommendations 
were reasonable, despite Dr. Reyes's contrary suggestions, 
because she "was examining Alyssa everyday (sic) and going 
through things in more detail than . . . Dr. Reyes had the 
time to do . . . ." Id. at 414. 
 
4. Mr. Alexander 
 
Mr. Alexander testified that the defendants persuaded the 
family to reject the liver transplant option in favor of 
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chelation therapy. For instance, Mr. Alexander testified that 
Dr. Neigut recommended that they should "pass" on the 
livers. See id. at 885. He testified that Dr. Neigut told the 
Alexanders that Alyssa had a good chance of survival 
without a transplant and that the chelation therapy was 
improving Alyssa's condition. See id. Mr. Alexander also 
testified that Dr. Orenstein stated that "everything looks 
great" and that "she doesn't see any need at all for a 
transplant." Id. at 818. 
 
5. Mrs. Alexander 
 
Mrs. Alexander testified that Dr. Neigut stated that a liver 
transplant was not necessary. See id. at 904. She further 
testified that Dr. Orenstein recommended that they should 
continue chelation therapy because Alyssa's lab reports 




The majority notes that, according to the testimony of 
Drs. Orenstein and Neigut, they never advised against a 
transplant. See Maj. Op. at 9. However, it is undisputed 
that they never advised in favor of a transplant until it was 
too late and that they instead consistently recommended 
chelation therapy. It is obvious, therefore, that the jury 
inferred that the defendants implicitly advised against a 
transplant (by instead recommending an alternative method 
of treatment) and that this implicit recommendation was 
negligent and was the proximate cause of Alyssa's death. 
And, as previously noted, the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's finding is not contested on appeal. 
 
Therefore, the defendants are essentially arguing that, 
although they negligently steered the family in a direction 
that proved fatal, they should not be held fully responsible 
for their actions because other doctors provided non- 
negligent information. The real question before us, then, is 
the following: in view of the fact that the defendants 
implicitly advised against a transplant and that this advice 
constituted medical malpractice, was there evidence that 
Alyssa, a young woman hospitalized with a life-threatening 
disease, and her parents, neither of whom had any medical 
background, were contributorily negligent in heeding the 
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defendants' implicit advice rather than that of the 
consultants who strongly recommended in favor of the 
transplant? I do not think so. 
 
The defendants have cited no Pennsylvania case, and I 
have uncovered none, that requires a contributory 
negligence charge under the circumstances presented here. 
Indeed, the only cases even remotely similar held that the 
instructions on contributory negligence were proper 
because the plaintiffs failed to follow the advice of their 
primary care physicians. See Ferguson v. Panzarella, 700 
A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding contributory 
negligence charge proper where plaintiff failed to attend 
scheduled doctor's appointments); Morganstein v. House, 
547 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding 
contributory negligence charge proper where plaintiff 
disregarded physician's instructions about working and 
taking medication). 
 
Here, the Alexanders followed the advice of their primary 
care physicians, and I fail to see how this can be deemed 
unreasonable. Indeed, Dr. Neigut conceded at trial that the 
Alexanders decision to rely upon her advice to forego the 
livers and continue with chelation therapy was "reasonable" 
because she was Alyssa's primary care physician. See App. 
at 373-74. And, as their primary defense at trial, the 
defendants argued that their decision to recommend 
chelation therapy over liver transplantation was medically 
reasonable. See Defendants' Closing Arg., App. at 1714 
("[C]helation, [the] medical approach, was a reasonable one 
. . . ."). 
 
I suppose that I can imagine an extreme case in which a 
physician's advice is so transparently wrong that a 
reasonable lay person would be negligent in heeding it. 
Here, however, the defendants' advice was not so obviously 
bad on its face that it fell into this category, and I do not 
think that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would allow 
them to escape all or part of their liability on contributory 
negligence grounds. Except perhaps in truly extreme cases, 
it is not negligent for a patient such as Alyssa or her 
parents to follow the advice of primary care physicians. To 
hold otherwise puts patients in an impossible position, 
undermines the relationship between patients and their 
 
                                21 
  
primary care physicians, and gives grossly negligent 
physicians an unwarranted way to escape malpractice 
liability. I therefore dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                22 
